According to @simplykashif, a new thread titled Quantum Computers vs Crypto, What You Should Know was posted on Nov 17, 2025, emphasizing daily learning while providing no technical details or price guidance in the teaser (source: @simplykashif on X, Nov 17, 2025). NIST states that sufficiently powerful quantum computers could break widely used public-key cryptography, motivating a shift to quantum-resistant standards (source: NIST press release, Aug 13, 2024). Bitcoin transaction signatures use ECDSA over secp256k1 and Ethereum accounts also rely on ECDSA secp256k1, implying a need for post-quantum migration to mitigate Shor-class risks over the long term (sources: Bitcoin.org Developer Guide; Ethereum.org documentation; NIST press release, Aug 13, 2024). NIST has standardized quantum-resistant algorithms including CRYSTALS-Kyber (FIPS 203) for key establishment and CRYSTALS-Dilithium (FIPS 204) for digital signatures in 2024, providing candidates for future blockchain research and testing (source: NIST press release, Aug 13, 2024). Traders can monitor follow-up posts for concrete items such as migration proposals, key-rotation policies, or hybrid-signature experiments, as the teaser signals this security theme will be discussed (source: @simplykashif on X, Nov 17, 2025).

According to the source, the core quantum threat to Bitcoin is that a sufficiently large fault-tolerant quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm could derive private keys from revealed ECDSA or Schnorr public keys, enabling unauthorized spends, while this is not feasible with today’s machines. source: Shor 1997; Bitcoin.org Developer Guide; BIP340 2020. UTXOs whose public keys have not been revealed on-chain are more resilient in the near term because address protection relies on hash preimages where Grover’s algorithm provides only a quadratic speedup, preserving roughly 128-bit security for SHA-256-based constructions. source: NISTIR 8105 2016; Bitcoin.org Developer Guide. There is currently no practical quantum computer capable of breaking Bitcoin’s public-key cryptography, but NIST finalized post-quantum standards in 2024 (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) that can guide migration paths for future signature schemes. source: NIST FIPS 203–205, 2024. Traders should monitor any BIPs proposing post-quantum signature types and watch for unusual spends from legacy P2PK or long-dormant outputs, as coordinated migrations can elevate on-chain congestion and fees that impact execution and volatility. source: BIP341 2021; Bitcoin Wiki Pay to Pubkey; Bitcoin.org Transactions–Fees.

According to the source, talk of an upcoming IBM quantum computing milestone has revived questions about a potential Bitcoin Q-Day, but current public data indicates today’s machines remain far from breaking BTC’s ECDSA signatures (source: publicly available social media post; IBM Research 2023 quantum roadmap). IBM disclosed a 1,121‑qubit Condor processor and utility-scale, error-mitigated results on a 127‑qubit Eagle device in 2023, which are non–fault-tolerant and insufficient for large-scale Shor attacks on ECDSA-secp256k1 (source: IBM Research; Nature 2023 evidence-of-utility paper). Breaking Bitcoin’s ECDSA would require thousands of logical qubits and extremely deep circuits, implying millions of physical qubits at current error rates—well beyond near-term hardware (source: Roetteler et al. 2017 quantum resource estimates; NIST post-quantum cryptography guidance). Bitcoin uses ECDSA over secp256k1 and is vulnerable in principle to Shor’s algorithm once large fault‑tolerant machines exist, while Schnorr (BIP-340) is similarly based on the discrete log problem (source: Bitcoin.org Developer Guide; Shor 1994). For trading, the near-term quantum risk premium to BTC appears low, but headline-driven volatility is possible; monitor IBM Research announcements, NIST/NSA PQC transition timelines starting mid‑2020s, and any Bitcoin Core discussions/BIPs on post‑quantum migration to gauge regime‑shift risk (source: IBM Research updates; NSA CNSA 2.0 memo; NIST PQC transition updates).

According to @TO, Satoshi’s BTC is held across about 22,000 different private keys with no seed phrases or exposed public keys, and quantum computing will not break them, which he presents as a security assurance for long-term holders and traders (source: https://twitter.com/TO/status/1988382753340182907). Independent on-chain research by Sergio Demian Lerner estimates the Patoshi miner accumulated roughly 1.1 million BTC across tens of thousands of coinbase outputs in 2009–2010, consistent with a very large number of distinct keys that have remained dormant (source: https://bitslog.com/2019/04/17/the-return-of-the-dld-patoshi/). Early Bitcoin wallets did not use hierarchical deterministic seeds because BIP32 was standardized only in 2012, after Satoshi’s departure, implying non-deterministic keys rather than seed phrases (sources: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki, https://bitcoin.org/en/developer-guide#wallets-keys). However, not all early outputs hide public keys: many 2009 coinbase outputs used pay-to-public-key scripts that reveal public keys on-chain, whereas P2PKH hides the key until spending, which is relevant for any quantum-security assessment (source: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transaction#Standard_transaction_types). Current cryptographic research indicates breaking Bitcoin’s secp256k1 ECDSA would require large, fault-tolerant quantum computers far beyond today’s capabilities, so brute-force or quantum attacks are not a practical near-term threat for traders to price in (sources: https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.06752, https://www.nist.gov/pqc). For trading strategy, the persistence of dormant Patoshi-pattern coins implies minimal immediate sell-pressure risk from these holdings, while any on-chain movement of such coinbase outputs would be a high-impact signal to monitor (source: https://bitslog.com/2019/04/17/the-return-of-the-dld-patoshi/).

According to Charles Edwards, Bitcoin faces a quantum-computing security risk that could enable spending of early Satoshi-era coins and trigger market selling, and he urges the community to act by 2026, source: Charles Edwards on X (Oct 13, 2025) and his linked YouTube video. Bitcoin transaction validation relies on ECDSA over secp256k1, which is theoretically vulnerable to sufficiently large fault-tolerant quantum computers via Shor’s algorithm, source: Bitcoin.org Developer Guide and P. W. Shor (1994). Many early outputs, including pay-to-public-key coinbase rewards used in 2009–2010, expose public keys on-chain and are therefore higher-risk if ECDSA is broken, source: Bitcoin.org Developer Guide and Bitcoin Wiki entry on Pay-to-PubKey. Independent on-chain research estimates roughly 1.1 million BTC attributed to early mining by Satoshi, underscoring potential market impact if such coins became movable, source: Sergio Demian Lerner’s Patoshi mining analysis. Governments have advanced post-quantum cryptography; NIST selected PQC algorithms and published draft standards for ML-DSA (Dilithium) and ML-KEM (Kyber) with guidance to begin migration planning, source: NIST PQC program announcements and migration guidance. Any Bitcoin move toward quantum-safe signatures would require protocol changes and broad coordination, making developer proposals and upgrade timelines important market catalysts for BTC, source: discussions on the bitcoin-dev mailing list and Bitcoin Core documentation.

According to @caprioleio, the US Dept of War has raised the alarm that a potential 'Q-Day' could arrive within three years, arguing BTC will not reach $1M per coin unless the quantum threat is addressed (source: @caprioleio on X, Oct 8, 2025). Bitcoin relies on ECDSA (secp256k1) for transaction signatures, which are theoretically breakable by sufficiently powerful quantum computers via Shor’s algorithm, making quantum security a systemic consideration for BTC (source: Bitcoin.org Developer Documentation; NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography program). U.S. standards bodies have already moved to mitigate such risks, with NIST publishing post-quantum cryptography standards in 2024 and the NSA’s CNSA 2.0 guidance setting migration timelines for national security systems, providing objective checkpoints for security transition risk (source: NIST 2024 PQC standards; NSA CNSA 2.0 guidance). For trading, monitor official NIST/NSA releases and any Bitcoin Core proposals on post-quantum signatures, as policy or development milestones can reprioritize BTC risk premia and hedging demand in derivatives markets (source: @caprioleio; NIST; NSA).

According to @caprioleio, Bitcoin must be upgraded to be quantum-proof by 2026, with a warning of severe consequences if no upgrade occurs. Source: https://twitter.com/caprioleio/status/1972473521730462153 The post sets a concrete 2026 timeline for quantum risk management around BTC’s signature schemes, signaling a near-term governance and security focus for market participants. Source: https://twitter.com/caprioleio/status/1972473521730462153 Bitcoin’s current signatures use ECDSA and Schnorr (BIP340) over secp256k1, both based on the discrete logarithm problem that Shor’s algorithm would break on a sufficiently large fault-tolerant quantum computer, underscoring why post-quantum migration is being standardized globally. Source: https://developer.bitcoin.org/devglossary.html#term-ecdsa https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0340.mediawiki https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography

According to @VitalikButerin, Ethereum still lacks full account abstraction, and non-ECDSA accounts cannot transact without relying on an intermediary. Source: Vitalik Buterin on X, Sep 10, 2025. He states that intermediary reliance harms privacy, weakens censorship resistance, and undermines permissionless access. Source: Vitalik Buterin on X, Sep 10, 2025. He adds that users cannot be quantum-safe without making their account depend on an intermediary, and that privacy protocols currently rely on a vulnerable public broadcaster ecosystem. Source: Vitalik Buterin on X, Sep 10, 2025. He emphasizes that significant work remains to get account abstraction right and warns against normalizing higher intermediary dependency before fixes arrive. Source: Vitalik Buterin on X, Sep 10, 2025. For traders, these statements identify unresolved design constraints that directly affect non-ECDSA wallets, quantum-resistant schemes, and privacy tooling—key pillars for smart-account adoption and self-custody UX in the ETH ecosystem. Source: Vitalik Buterin on X, Sep 10, 2025.

According to Charles Edwards (@caprioleio), quantum computing is Bitcoin’s biggest existential threat and, once a replacement is selected, the ecosystem would have roughly 12 months to migrate, placing urgency on protocol choices that traders should monitor; source: Charles Edwards on X, Aug 21, 2025. Bitcoin relies on ECDSA over secp256k1 for transaction signatures, which is vulnerable to sufficiently powerful quantum attacks such as Shor’s algorithm, making signature replacement the core mitigation; source: NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography program and Bitcoin.org Developer Guide. NIST has standardized post-quantum signature schemes including CRYSTALS-Dilithium and SPHINCS+, offering candidate pathways for migration that Bitcoin developers could evaluate; source: NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standards 2022–2024. Traders should watch for any Bitcoin Improvement Proposal introducing post-quantum signatures and activation timelines, as protocol changes require broad consensus and staged rollout; source: Bitcoin Improvement Proposals repository. Coins reveal public keys when spent, so UTXOs with exposed public keys carry higher quantum-theft risk under a breakthrough, informing on-chain risk assessment; source: Bitcoin.org Developer Guide and Bitcoin Wiki.

According to BitMEX Research, the Bitcoin (BTC) Lightning Network faces significant security risks from future quantum computers, which could break its underlying ECDSA cryptography. The research outlines a detailed proposal for making Lightning Network transactions quantum-resistant by implementing post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards, such as a one-time signature scheme. While this proposed upgrade could lead to larger transaction sizes and increased complexity, BitMEX Research emphasizes that it is a crucial measure to safeguard the long-term security of funds transacted on Bitcoin's primary layer-2 scaling solution.

According to @deanmlittle, ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) is identified as a foundational component securing Bitcoin and other major cryptocurrencies, directly impacting trading security and transaction validation. Traders should note that ECDSA’s robustness ensures the authenticity of blockchain transactions, reducing risks of unauthorized trades and supporting market trust, as highlighted by the referenced tweet (Source: Twitter/@deanmlittle, May 9, 2025). This cryptographic standard underpins the reliability of crypto exchanges and wallets, making it essential for risk assessment and technical analysis in crypto trading.