According to the source, Zcash developers are preparing for quantum risks by leveraging the protocol’s repeatable network upgrade process, demonstrated by NU5 in May 2022 which shipped Halo 2 and the Orchard shielded pool, showing the chain can change core cryptography through on-chain consensus (source: Electric Coin Company, 2022). Both BTC and ZEC currently depend on elliptic-curve cryptography that would be breakable by sufficiently large quantum computers, highlighting the need for migration paths and key-rotation tooling (source: NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography project, 2024; Bitcoin.org Developer Guide). NIST has standardized post-quantum signature families ML-DSA (CRYSTALS-Dilithium) and SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+), which are candidates for future blockchain integrations once performance and footprint constraints are evaluated (source: NIST PQC standards, 2024). Zcash’s ZIP governance process and active engineering by Electric Coin Company and the Zcash Foundation provide a mechanism to propose and deploy such primitives, while Bitcoin’s developer community has discussed PQ options on the bitcoin-dev mailing list without any PQ signature scheme adopted on mainnet to date (sources: Zcash ZIP repository; Zcash Foundation updates; bitcoin-dev mailing list). For trading, the most actionable signals are: the appearance of ZIPs proposing PQ signatures or key-rotation, ECC/ZF engineering updates announcing testnet deployments or audits, and release timelines similar to prior Zcash upgrades that preceded mainnet activations (sources: Zcash ZIP repository; Electric Coin Company engineering updates; Zcash Foundation engineering posts).

According to @caprioleio, Bitcoin must confront the quantum computing threat now to secure its next decade, a point he discussed on The Investors Podcast video at youtube.com/watch?v=dFknx-mRmKE, source: Charles Edwards on X (Nov 16, 2025); The Investors Podcast on YouTube. For trading context, Bitcoin’s current digital signatures (ECDSA and Schnorr over secp256k1) are theoretically vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm once sufficiently capable fault-tolerant quantum computers exist, making a migration path to post-quantum schemes a material security consideration, source: BIP340 Schnorr signatures; Bitcoin Core documentation; P. W. Shor, SIAM Journal on Computing. Standards progress is underway, with NIST finalizing initial post-quantum cryptography standards in 2024 (FIPS 203–206), providing concrete algorithm baselines that wallets and custodians can evaluate, source: NIST PQC standardization announcements (2024), FIPS 203–206. Actionable for traders, monitor three catalysts: new Bitcoin Improvement Proposals introducing post-quantum signatures, wallet software updates referencing NIST-approved PQC, and exchange or custodian security disclosures on PQ readiness, as highlighted by @caprioleio’s call for preparedness, source: Bitcoin BIPs repository; NIST PQC FIPS 203–206; major exchange security pages (e.g., Coinbase Security).

According to the source, the core quantum threat to Bitcoin is that a sufficiently large fault-tolerant quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm could derive private keys from revealed ECDSA or Schnorr public keys, enabling unauthorized spends, while this is not feasible with today’s machines. source: Shor 1997; Bitcoin.org Developer Guide; BIP340 2020. UTXOs whose public keys have not been revealed on-chain are more resilient in the near term because address protection relies on hash preimages where Grover’s algorithm provides only a quadratic speedup, preserving roughly 128-bit security for SHA-256-based constructions. source: NISTIR 8105 2016; Bitcoin.org Developer Guide. There is currently no practical quantum computer capable of breaking Bitcoin’s public-key cryptography, but NIST finalized post-quantum standards in 2024 (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) that can guide migration paths for future signature schemes. source: NIST FIPS 203–205, 2024. Traders should monitor any BIPs proposing post-quantum signature types and watch for unusual spends from legacy P2PK or long-dormant outputs, as coordinated migrations can elevate on-chain congestion and fees that impact execution and volatility. source: BIP341 2021; Bitcoin Wiki Pay to Pubkey; Bitcoin.org Transactions–Fees.

According to the source, IBM has publicly demonstrated the 127-qubit Eagle in 2021 and the 433-qubit Osprey in 2022, and unveiled the 1,121-qubit Condor in 2023, as documented in the IBM Research quantum roadmap and announcements. NIST states that cryptographically relevant, fault-tolerant quantum computers do not yet exist and has initiated a multi-year migration to post-quantum standards, per NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization updates in 2022 and 2024. For Bitcoin’s secp256k1 ECDSA, resource estimates indicate very large error-corrected qubit counts and long runtimes are required for Shor-based attacks, far beyond today’s devices, per Roetteler et al. 2017 and NIST assessments. In practice, only outputs whose public keys are revealed at spend are directly exposed before any upgrade, while P2PKH, P2WPKH, and Taproot outputs reveal the pubkey only on spending, limiting immediate on-chain attack surface, per the Bitcoin.org Developer Guide.

According to the source, Trezor unveiled its new Safe 7 hardware wallet, marketed as anticipating a post-quantum future for private-key protection. Source: Trezor. For traders, the launch broadens self-custody options for BTC and ETH by keeping keys offline and away from exchange counterparty risk. Source: Trezor. Long-horizon holders should track vendor roadmaps to adopt NIST-selected post-quantum cryptography such as CRYSTALS-Kyber and Dilithium to mitigate future key exposure risks. Source: NIST. To gauge market impact, monitor hardware wallet sales updates alongside exchange BTC and ETH balance trends commonly watched by market participants. Source: Glassnode.

According to Charles Edwards (@caprioleio), up to 20–30% of BTC held in legacy P2PK outputs could be taken by a future quantum computer within 2–8 years, and he proposes either allowing theft-related dumping or enforcing a migration window that burns unmigrated coins (source: Charles Edwards on X, Oct 15, 2025). According to Bitcoin Wiki, P2PK outputs reveal public keys on-chain, leaving any unspent P2PK UTXOs inherently exposed if Shor’s algorithm breaks secp256k1 ECDSA (source: Bitcoin Wiki, Pay-to-Pubkey). According to NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography program, no cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists today, though ECDSA is not quantum-safe and migration to standardized PQC schemes like CRYSTALS-Dilithium will be required once timelines warrant (source: NIST PQC status reports, 2022–2024). According to Roetteler et al. (Microsoft Research), breaking a single secp256k1 key demands very large fault-tolerant quantum resources beyond current hardware, making the specific 2–8 year horizon uncertain for traders to price (source: Roetteler et al., 2017, Quantum Resource Estimates for ECC).

According to @caprioleio, the US Dept of War has raised the alarm that a potential 'Q-Day' could arrive within three years, arguing BTC will not reach $1M per coin unless the quantum threat is addressed (source: @caprioleio on X, Oct 8, 2025). Bitcoin relies on ECDSA (secp256k1) for transaction signatures, which are theoretically breakable by sufficiently powerful quantum computers via Shor’s algorithm, making quantum security a systemic consideration for BTC (source: Bitcoin.org Developer Documentation; NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography program). U.S. standards bodies have already moved to mitigate such risks, with NIST publishing post-quantum cryptography standards in 2024 and the NSA’s CNSA 2.0 guidance setting migration timelines for national security systems, providing objective checkpoints for security transition risk (source: NIST 2024 PQC standards; NSA CNSA 2.0 guidance). For trading, monitor official NIST/NSA releases and any Bitcoin Core proposals on post-quantum signatures, as policy or development milestones can reprioritize BTC risk premia and hedging demand in derivatives markets (source: @caprioleio; NIST; NSA).