According to @deanmlittle, futarchy markets present three payoff cases for traders: buying and the proposal fails makes late buyers exit liquidity for others. Source: @deanmlittle on X, Sep 3, 2025, https://twitter.com/deanmlittle/status/1963090336697536732 According to @deanmlittle, if the proposal passes while the asset trades below NAV, buyers profit as the discount converges to net asset value. Source: @deanmlittle on X, Sep 3, 2025, https://twitter.com/deanmlittle/status/1963090336697536732 According to @deanmlittle, if the proposal passes while trading above NAV, buyers effectively pay a premium to recoup investment, indicating adverse entry pricing. Source: @deanmlittle on X, Sep 3, 2025, https://twitter.com/deanmlittle/status/1963090336697536732 According to @deanmlittle, this framing centers trading decisions on NAV discount or premium relative to pass or fail probabilities in on-chain governance markets, and he asks whether an alternative rational thesis exists. Source: @deanmlittle on X, Sep 3, 2025, https://twitter.com/deanmlittle/status/1963090336697536732

According to Vitalik Buterin, futarchy could have significant implications for cryptocurrency markets by providing a governance model that aligns market incentives with decision-making, potentially enhancing market efficiency and investor confidence.

According to Vitalik Buterin, in an article re-shared from 2021, the concept of 'skin in the game for governance' as presented by @_futarchy is a viable approach for enhancing governance in open crypto systems. He emphasizes that while such systems have a bribeable governance layer, their indirect nature means they are less prone to straightforward financial manipulation, thereby increasing robustness against bribery. This insight is crucial for traders looking to understand the long-term stability and governance integrity of blockchain projects. Source: Vitalik Buterin's Twitter.