BRICS Coin 2025: What a Common Digital Currency Would Mean for the Rupee

BRICS Coin 2025: What a Common Digital Currency Would Mean for the Rupee - Blockchain.News

The phrase “BRICS coin” makes for punchy headlines. But in 2025, what exists is a patchwork of local-currency deals and a push to make cross-border payments cheaper—not a single, shared money. That distinction matters for India and for the rupee.

First, what BRICS is (and isn’t) building in 2025

At the July 6–7, 2025 BRICS Summit in Rio, leaders adopted a declaration that emphasized cross-border payment interoperability and the greater use of local currencies. The text and surrounding commentary point to technical work on a BRICS payment initiative, not the launch of a supranational “BRICS coin.”

This framing lines up with what senior officials have said for more than a year. South Africa’s finance minister stated in 2023 that any BRICS system would not replace SWIFT and would focus instead on enabling trade in members’ own currencies. In January 2025, the Kremlin similarly said there was no plan for a BRICS currency, after U.S. tariff threats revived the rumor mill.

India’s position has been consistent: focus on local-currency trade and rupee internationalisation, not on de-dollarisation via a new bloc currency. That line was reiterated by New Delhi in August 2025.

Bottom line: there is no official BRICS coin in 2025. The live agenda is interoperable payments plus settlement in national currencies.

What that agenda already looks like for India

India has been using the BRICS moment to advance rupee-centric rails with key partners, especially in the Gulf:

India–UAE Local Currency Settlement (LCSS): The RBI and the UAE central bank signed MoUs in July 2023 to promote rupee–dirham settlement and link fast-payment systems (UPI ↔︎ UAE IPP). Reuters reported in August 2024 that RBI then nudged banks to actually use the rupee–dirham corridor.
Payment system links: The same MoUs cover UPI/IPP and card-switch interoperability, laying the groundwork for cheaper cross-border retail transfers—again in domestic currencies rather than a new coin.
Development finance in local currencies: The New Development Bank (NDB)—BRICS’ multilateral bank—has been expanding local-currency borrowing and lending, with sizeable CNY and ZAR programmes alongside USD. This is another incremental way to shift funding toward members’ own currencies without inventing a new one.

If there were a BRICS coin someday, what would it mean for the rupee?

It’s fair to consider hypotheticals, but let’s keep them anchored to today’s reality: no design has been agreed publicly. With that caveat, the implications would hinge on design choices:

Unit of account vs. settlement token.
A supranational unit of account—used only to net obligations—would leave domestic pricing, salaries and taxes in rupees. A retail token circulating in India would be far more disruptive for RBI policy and for the payments ecosystem. There’s no official move toward the latter.
Collateral and governance.
A credible common instrument would need rule-bound backing (e.g., a basket of member currencies/commodities) and clear decision-making. BRICS has struggled to produce joint economic texts even in 2025 (foreign ministers couldn’t agree on a communique in April), which hints at how hard a shared monetary project would be.
Convertibility and capital flows.
The rupee is only partially convertible on the capital account. A shared currency with full convertibility would clash with India’s prudential stance; a limited-convertibility instrument would, by design, be niche. (BRICS debates therefore keep returning to interlinking what already exists.)

Translation for India: unless the politics, governance, and convertibility puzzles are solved, a “BRICS coin” would likely be a back-office settlement tool, not something displacing the rupee in everyday life.

What is changing for the rupee

Even without a BRICS coin, the rupee’s operating environment is shifting in ways that matter:

More trade billed and settled in non-USD pairs. The push for rupee–dirham settlement, and dirham use in India’s Russia trade, points to incremental dollar-light corridors. For a deficit country, that can modestly reduce USD funding needs and FX basis costs—if counterparties are willing.
More plumbing for non-USD payments. BRICS leaders tasked officials to continue work on cross-border payments interoperability. Cheaper, faster pipes raise the odds that counterparties accept rupee invoices—especially where payment finality and messaging are seamless.
MDB support: local-currency finance. NDB’s local-currency issuance/lending helps build benchmarks and hedging markets over time (you can’t internationalise a currency without term curves and instruments).

None of this shields the rupee from global shocks; RBI has still had to step into markets in 2025 to maintain order. But it widens the toolkit beyond the dollar, at the margin.

The risks and frictions

Political fragmentation. The 2025 summit was heavy on rhetoric and light on hard joint economics. Absent binding commitments, the practical work defaults to bilateral deals (like India–UAE) rather than bloc solutions.
Liquidity reality. Global trade still clears in dollars because deep markets exist for hedging, collateral, and short-term funding. Building comparable liquidity in rupee corridors will take years and policy patience. (IMF data show the BRICS’ large PPP weight, but that doesn’t automatically translate to currency market depth.)
Compliance optics. Any new rails will face scrutiny over sanctions evasion and AML/CFT standards. That makes transparent governance and cooperation with global standard-setters essential for credibility. (South Africa’s statement on not “replacing” SWIFT reflects this reality.)

The likely path—no drama, plenty of plumbing

All signs in 2025 point to a practical, plumbing-first path:

Link existing fast-payment systems and messaging so retail and SME payments are cheaper and instant across borders.
Grow local-currency settlement in high-volume corridors (UAE, potentially others), supported by market-making and hedging tools.
Use NDB and commercial banks to issue and lend in local currencies, building market depth step by step.
Keep the “common currency” idea on the shelf unless governance and convertibility obstacles are resolved—something no member has publicly offered to do yet.

What it means for Indian readers

For policymakers: The best lever is rupee corridors where trade volume is thick (UAE, possibly Indonesia/Saudi in time), coupled with FX market development and predictable capital controls. That will do more for the rupee’s reach than headline-grabbing coin proposals.
For businesses: Start by negotiating invoicing in INR/AED where counterparties already bank in both currencies. As the payment links firm up, settlement risk and cost can fall—especially for SMEs.
For consumers and migrants: The payoff shows up as cheaper remittances/retail transfers when fast-payment links go live at scale (UPI ↔︎ foreign instant rails), though timelines are phased and depend on banks’ execution.

The sober verdict

In 2025, “BRICS coin” is more meme than mandate. The real story is quieter: payment pipes are being fused, and local-currency usage is inching up where it’s commercially sensible. For the rupee, that is still consequential. It won’t dethrone the dollar—but by turning a few big trade hoses away from it, India can trim costs, add resilience, and gain bargaining power without ceding monetary autonomy.

That—not a shiny new token—is what progress looks like this year.

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