According to @BitMEXResearch, raising Bitcoin’s OP_RETURN policy limit benefits individual users by making Compact Blocks and pre-block signature validation caching more effective for nodes that run a higher limit (source: BitMEX Research on X, Sep 30, 2025). According to @BitMEXResearch, the pro-filter camp wants users to incur personal costs and operate less effective nodes for the common good of deterring spam, contrasting with a policy consistent with individual sovereignty (source: BitMEX Research on X, Sep 30, 2025). According to @BitMEXResearch, miners selecting transactions to maximize revenue reflects a pro-business, pro-market approach, whereas pro-filter advocates ask miners to sacrifice revenue for the greater good, framing the policy discussion around fee revenue selection rather than a political shift (source: BitMEX Research on X, Sep 30, 2025; BitMEX Research blog: blog.bitmex.com/all-for-one-one-for-all/).

According to BitMEX Research, home “pleb” node runners who do not send transactions can sometimes influence Bitcoin by supporting looser policy rules, while they are largely ineffective at tightening policy rules. Source: BitMEX Research on X, Sep 16, 2025. This view is consistent with Bitcoin Core documentation that policy and standardness are non-consensus, node-local rules, so transactions rejected by some nodes can still propagate and be mined if other nodes use looser relay policy. Source: Bitcoin Core Documentation, Policy, accessed Sep 16, 2025. For traders, this asymmetry means relaxations in relay policy can spread bottom-up without miner coordination, potentially broadening transaction relay and shifting mempool composition and fee dynamics that affect BTC on-chain costs and timing. Source: BitMEX Research on X, Sep 16, 2025; Bitcoin Core Documentation, Policy, accessed Sep 16, 2025. Conversely, rapid community-driven tightening is less likely to be effective without adoption by miners and major relays, making miner policy signals and fee-rate curves key monitoring points for BTC liquidity and execution risk. Source: BitMEX Research on X, Sep 16, 2025; Bitcoin Core Documentation, Policy, accessed Sep 16, 2025; Bitcoin.org Developer Guide, Fees, accessed Sep 16, 2025.

According to @adam3us, censorship-resistant network dynamics mean a tolerant minority sets effective policy limits, and preferential peering amplifies this, making Bitcoin Knots node policies almost completely ineffective already and both before and after the Bitcoin Core 30 release, indicating minimal change to BTC transaction relay and mempool policy from Knots-driven attempts; Source: Adam Back on X, Sep 15, 2025: https://twitter.com/adam3us/status/1967463326319104053. For BTC traders, this signals sustained censorship resistance and continuity of relay behavior around the Core 30 timeline, reducing near-term network-policy risk relative to Knots-specific settings; Source: Adam Back on X, Sep 15, 2025: https://twitter.com/adam3us/status/1967463326319104053.