According to @stonecoldpat0, the list of PoS Ethereum block proposers is known two epochs in advance, about 12 minutes, creating both operational risks and coordination benefits for ETH market participants (source: @stonecoldpat0). On the risk side, an adversary can target the identified upcoming proposer and briefly knock them offline; a selective 4 to 8 second disruption is enough to interrupt their slot, impacting liveness in that block window (source: @stonecoldpat0). On the utility side, protocols leveraging L2 stakers, including based rollups, can use this advance knowledge to send required data to the correct proposer at the right time, aiding L2 coordination (source: @stonecoldpat0). This DoS risk versus lookup utility trade-off will play out over time and is directly tied to validator uptime and L2 execution timing on Ethereum (source: @stonecoldpat0).

According to @stonecoldpat0, he has taken considerably fewer speaking slots over the past two years, totaling roughly 3–4 talks and about 4 panels, source: Patrick McCorry on X, Nov 13, 2025, https://twitter.com/stonecoldpat0/status/1989098336452780032. He stated that day-to-day, people-oriented work reduced his time to explain difficult technical topics or gain exposure to them, source: Patrick McCorry on X, Nov 13, 2025, https://twitter.com/stonecoldpat0/status/1989098336452780032. He set a New Year resolution to prioritize more technical work and fewer people-oriented tasks and is looking forward to sessions at Devconnect to kickstart that shift, source: Patrick McCorry on X, Nov 13, 2025, https://twitter.com/stonecoldpat0/status/1989098336452780032.

According to Patrick McCorry (@stonecoldpat0), added blockchain throughput is quickly absorbed by MEV bots, so even a 100x capacity increase does not ensure cheaper gas because fees must remain meaningful to deter spam and abuse. Source: Patrick McCorry (Twitter, Nov 13, 2025) According to Patrick McCorry, transaction fees originated as an anti-DoS mechanism rather than a revenue stream, which structurally necessitates non-trivial fees even after scaling. Source: Patrick McCorry (Twitter, Nov 13, 2025) According to Patrick McCorry, the core imbalance is that aggregate MEV profits exceed what users are willing to pay, enabling bots to afford fees while pricing out low-fee applications. Source: Patrick McCorry (Twitter, Nov 13, 2025) According to Patrick McCorry, these dynamics challenge trading theses that assume scaling alone will cut fees, implying fee relief-driven adoption narratives may be unreliable without direct MEV mitigation. Source: Patrick McCorry (Twitter, Nov 13, 2025)

According to @stonecoldpat0, the main blocker to cheaper on-chain execution is that MEV bots immediately absorb any added blockspace, so throughput increases alone will not sustainably lower transaction fees, source: @stonecoldpat0. He states that fees were introduced primarily as a DoS and anti-spam mechanism rather than a revenue source, and even with 100x capacity, fees must remain meaningful to impose costs on bots and prevent resource abuse, source: @stonecoldpat0. He frames the binding condition as collective MEV profits versus what real users are willing to pay in fees; if MEV profits exceed user fee tolerance, congestion and elevated costs persist, source: @stonecoldpat0. Trading takeaway: plan for a non-zero fee floor and sustained MEV-driven competition during peak events; strategies dependent on ultra-cheap on-chain execution need added MEV mitigation or alternative execution routes to remain viable, source: @stonecoldpat0.

According to Patrick McCorry, monthly pay of USD 2,000 to 5,000 is materially significant in real-world terms, implying that relatively modest stipends can attract meaningful contributor effort in crypto projects. Source: Patrick McCorry, Twitter, Nov 12, 2025. For traders, this frames evaluation of token incentive design, bounties, and airdrop budgets: projects allocating stipends in this range may secure community work without outsized token emissions, influencing near-term circulating supply and potential sell pressure. Source: Patrick McCorry, Twitter, Nov 12, 2025. Actionably, monitor grant sizes, ambassador programs, and monthly token distributions around this level in project updates and governance forums to assess sustainability, contributor retention risk, and dilution impact. Source: Patrick McCorry, Twitter, Nov 12, 2025.

According to @stonecoldpat0, many crypto product teams are still tinkering with backend blockchain infrastructure instead of shipping user-facing features, which can delay launches by a year or more (Source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Nov 9, 2025). He likens this to building a new Linux to launch an email app, implying unnecessary complexity for most teams (Source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Nov 9, 2025). For traders, this flags elevated roadmap-slippage risk on projects building custom chains or heavy infra, warranting discounted timelines for catalysts such as mainnet, airdrops, and TVL growth (Source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Nov 9, 2025). Portfolio screens may overweight teams that ship on battle-tested infrastructure and underweight projects with bespoke base-layer ambitions absent near-term product milestones (Source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Nov 9, 2025). Monitor communications for explicit product-first roadmaps and de-risked launch dates to gauge catalyst reliability (Source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Nov 9, 2025).

According to @stonecoldpat0, it is a sad day for DeFi and he hopes the hacker cooperates and returns the funds (source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Nov 3, 2025). The post signals a DeFi security incident but provides no details on the affected protocol, chain, assets, amount, or resolution timeline, limiting trade-specific visibility at this time (source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Nov 3, 2025). For traders, the absence of identifiers or on-chain references means elevated uncertainty for DeFi risk sentiment until official or on-chain confirmations are released (source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Nov 3, 2025).

According to @stonecoldpat0, USDT and USDC can effectively influence Ethereum's fork choice during controversial chain splits by determining which on-chain token version they support, and DeFi on an unsupported fork would collapse if issuers reject its token value (source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Nov 2, 2025). According to @stonecoldpat0, the growing role of RWAs and multiple stablecoins makes governance a cooperative coordination game where issuers seek consensus on one chain and rule set to protect token value (source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Nov 2, 2025). According to @stonecoldpat0, coordination could rely on a correlated signal such as the largest RWA, guidance from the Ethereum Foundation, or staker signaling, echoing miner signaling during the block size wars (source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Nov 2, 2025). According to @stonecoldpat0, these dynamics expose ETH and DeFi liquidity to tail risk around contested upgrades, with stablecoin issuer decisions acting as the decisive driver of on-chain valuations in a split scenario (source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Nov 2, 2025).

According to @stonecoldpat0, L1 criticism of rollups misses five trading-relevant advantages that shape positioning and risk management for crypto portfolios, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Oct 27, 2025. The post highlights product-market fit with a growing user base, strong interest in adopting rollup tech stacks, cost efficiency that removes the need for high token inflation, low-latency and low-cost execution, and MEV solutions that alleviate pressure, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Oct 27, 2025. The author contends there will be thousands of rollups while only a meaningful handful of L1s survive, framing a market structure where liquidity and activity consolidate around L2 environments, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Oct 27, 2025. For traders, this thesis implies monitoring potential rotation risk away from inflation-heavy L1 tokens toward rollup ecosystems characterized by stronger usage and lower dilution, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Oct 27, 2025. Positioning considerations include tracking onchain activity growth, fee levels, and MEV mitigation adoption across rollups to gauge execution quality and potential revenue capture, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Oct 27, 2025. A key risk flagged by the post is prolonged underperformance for L1s reliant on high emissions relative to rollups that do not require such inflation, which may affect token supply dynamics and pricing, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Oct 27, 2025.

According to Patrick McCorry, crypto should reward merit over geography and founders must assemble and retain top contributors under libertarian principles, framing why team quality is central to project outcomes that investors monitor. Source: Patrick McCorry (@stonecoldpat0) on X, Oct 18, 2025. He states that good people attract good people, so founders should do everything to help top contributors take an early bet on the project and then be selective to compound the snowball effect. Source: Patrick McCorry (@stonecoldpat0) on X, Oct 18, 2025. He advises cutting rot and toxicity early because strong contributors will not stay in toxic environments, and he recommends observing how others react when someone leaves as a litmus test for hidden toxicity. Source: Patrick McCorry (@stonecoldpat0) on X, Oct 18, 2025. He recommends leveraging limited availability of high-impact contributors rather than letting capacity sit idle, emphasizing process design to make the most of scarce expert time. Source: Patrick McCorry (@stonecoldpat0) on X, Oct 18, 2025. He notes that persistent frustration about direction and pace leads to departures and suggests surrounding the core team with people aligned on the path or willing to disagree and commit. Source: Patrick McCorry (@stonecoldpat0) on X, Oct 18, 2025. He stresses opportunity cost and fairness, warning that underpaying strong contributors leads to outbidding by others and that equitable treatment reduces resentment and attrition. Source: Patrick McCorry (@stonecoldpat0) on X, Oct 18, 2025. For traders and token investors, these governance and retention signals can be monitored as proxies for execution risk and community health during due diligence and position sizing, per McCorry’s guidance. Source: Patrick McCorry (@stonecoldpat0) on X, Oct 18, 2025.

According to @stonecoldpat0, Tempo is assembling a strong team around a stablecoin effort. source: @stonecoldpat0 (Twitter, Oct 17, 2025) According to @stonecoldpat0, the project should avoid Libra’s mistakes by keeping the stablecoin simple, not delaying the go-live date, iterating quickly on the technology, and prioritizing the user interface. source: @stonecoldpat0 (Twitter, Oct 17, 2025) According to @stonecoldpat0, these execution priorities put speed to market and usability at the center of the roadmap. source: @stonecoldpat0 (Twitter, Oct 17, 2025) According to @stonecoldpat0, traders tracking Tempo can focus on whether the team ships quickly, iterates at a high cadence, and delivers a simple, clean UI, as these are explicitly highlighted milestones. source: @stonecoldpat0 (Twitter, Oct 17, 2025)

According to Patrick McCorry, crypto’s publicly verifiable, on-chain design enables market participants to detect and correct transaction mistakes in real time, strengthening transparency and truthfulness for traders (source: https://twitter.com/stonecoldpat0/status/1978705379849883935). He contrasts this with legacy, opaque systems where such errors likely occur and are not immediately visible, emphasizing the trading advantage of open verification for timely risk monitoring (source: https://twitter.com/stonecoldpat0/status/1978705379849883935). McCorry referenced a Whale Alert post as an example of public on-chain monitoring that surfaces anomalies instantly to the market, reinforcing the utility of real-time alerts for trade execution and risk control (source: https://x.com/whale_alert/status/1978539763301744815).

According to @stonecoldpat0, despite claims that stablecoins will force banks to share deposit yield, USDC and USDT holders generally do not receive the underlying reserve yield unless coins are held on custodial exchanges that choose to share it, limiting direct wallet-level income today, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Oct 4, 2025. According to @stonecoldpat0, only when stablecoins rebase on-chain and pass yield directly to user addresses would they exert meaningful pressure on bank deposit pricing, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Oct 4, 2025. According to @stonecoldpat0, the trading takeaway is that until USDC and USDT implement on-chain rebasing or other pass-through mechanisms, stablecoin carry remains issuer- or custodian-captured rather than wallet-native, so DeFi stablecoin APYs and bank-competition catalysts are unlikely to see a structural uplift in the near term, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Oct 4, 2025.

According to @stonecoldpat0, DAO tokenholders may vote to maximize personal profit via token price rather than the ecosystem’s long-term value, creating misaligned incentives; source: @stonecoldpat0, Twitter post dated Sep 10, 2025. The author states that some voters could oppose proposals perceived as positive if rejection leads to a lower token price, enabling cheaper accumulation; source: @stonecoldpat0, Twitter post dated Sep 10, 2025. This implies adversarial voting behavior that can pressure DAO token prices around governance events and elevate short-term volatility, a risk traders should factor into positioning and liquidity management; source: @stonecoldpat0, Twitter post dated Sep 10, 2025.

According to @stonecoldpat0, the US policy appeal of USD stablecoins is to expand the buyer base for US Treasuries rather than to transition everything into stablecoins and then devalue them, which would also devalue USD itself; source: @stonecoldpat0. He calls the devaluation narrative scaremongering and asserts stablecoins are positioned to gain significant market share in coming years, with USD enjoying a head start due to market forces; source: @stonecoldpat0. For traders, his view points to tracking stablecoin market share and demand for T-bills as indicators for on-chain USD liquidity conditions that underpin crypto trading activity; source: @stonecoldpat0.

According to Patrick McCorry, the current Bitcoin OP_RETURN governance dispute has turned toxic despite not involving a consensus rule change, highlighting that the issue is about policy-level standardness rather than base consensus. Source: Patrick McCorry on X. In Bitcoin Core, OP_RETURN handling is governed by standardness policy and not consensus, allowing nodes and miners to independently choose relay and inclusion behavior, which can alter transaction propagation and block composition. Source: Bitcoin Core documentation. Relay and inclusion policies directly affect mempool backlog and fee rates that traders monitor when assessing BTC liquidity and intraday volatility, making mempool size, feerate bands, and miner inclusion patterns key signals around this debate. Source: Bitcoin Core documentation on mempool and fee estimation.

According to @stonecoldpat0, launching a blockchain requires specifying the decision-making quorum, validator uptime targets, per-agent participation costs, and how validators are compensated or can profit, positioning these variables as the core constraints every new network must solve, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Sep 7, 2025. He states that to pay validators purely via fees, average fee multiplied by throughput must exceed per-validator compensation, making the economics challenging at scale, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Sep 7, 2025. He notes that with thousands of validators and monthly validator costs in the range of $10k to $100k, expenses escalate and typically require token inflation that pays validators at the expense of everyone else, implying dilution risk for non-validator stakeholders, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Sep 7, 2025. He adds that only a few networks may eventually earn enough fees to cover costs without inflation, meaning a broad set of L1s is unlikely to be sustainably fee-funded, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Sep 7, 2025. He argues L2s are compelling because fewer than 10 agents can run the network, making it far more likely that fee revenue can cover costs with no token inflation required, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Sep 7, 2025. He also highlights that L2s preserve experimentation with custom VMs and proofs while accessing the soon-to-be greatest liquidity source, enabling neutrality and resilience without massive validator sets, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Sep 7, 2025. These points make validator count, per-node cost, fee-throughput coverage, and reliance on inflation key inputs for assessing network sustainability and dilution dynamics when comparing L1s vs L2s, source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, Sep 7, 2025.

According to @stonecoldpat0, there has been no Bitcoin spam for a while and he supports Bitcoin Core updating transaction relay rules, citing context from an @ercwl talk and stating it is not 2014 anymore, implying policy modernisation is warranted for the network stack. Source: @stonecoldpat0 on X, 2025-08-28. Relay rules determine which transactions nodes relay and accept into mempools, shaping propagation and standardness policies that directly influence throughput under load and the fee market during congestion. Source: Bitcoin Core policy and relay documentation; Bitcoin.org Developer Guide (Transactions, Mempool, and Fees). For BTC traders, any relay policy change can shift mempool composition and effective minimum fee rates for timely confirmations, so monitor mempool size and median fee-rate changes around implementation windows to manage slippage and settlement risk. Source: Bitcoin.org Developer Guide on fees and confirmation dynamics; Bitcoin Core policy documentation. Tactical takeaway: if mempool backlog rises and fee-rate floors climb following relay-policy adjustments, tighten intraday risk limits on on-chain settlement, widen withdrawal-fee assumptions for arbitrage legs, and prioritize high-fee, child-pays-for-parent strategies to maintain confirmation speed. Source: Bitcoin.org Developer Guide (fee estimation, CPFP mechanics); Bitcoin Core policy documentation.

According to Patrick McCorry, the open question is why Governor Bravo-style governance sets quorum relative to the total votable supply rather than the sum of delegated tokens, and whether this choice was driven by gas constraints around 2021; he raised the issue on X on Aug 23, 2025. Source: https://twitter.com/stonecoldpat0/status/1959147607751790772 In Compound’s Governor Alpha/Bravo, quorum is a fixed absolute threshold (e.g., 400,000 COMP required) while voting power still comes from delegated votes at a snapshot block, meaning the quorum requirement is not tied to the currently delegated supply. Source: https://docs.compound.finance/v2/governance/ Uniswap’s Governor Bravo implementation defines quorum as 4% of UNI total supply at the snapshot block, explicitly anchoring quorum to total supply rather than the amount currently delegated. Source: https://docs.uniswap.org/concepts/governance/overview The design rationale for total-supply-based quorum is to ensure sufficient participation and mitigate governance capture, as the OpenZeppelin Governor framework specifies quorum as a fraction of the token’s past total supply via on-chain snapshots. Source: https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/4.x/governance#quorum For trading, total-supply-anchored or fixed absolute quorums make proposals dependent on broad participation before execution, which can slow or constrain fee or parameter changes that may act as catalysts for COMP and UNI until quorum is reached. Source: https://docs.compound.finance/v2/governance/ and https://docs.uniswap.org/concepts/governance/overview

According to @stonecoldpat0, the key question is whether Stripe and Circle are holding back potential L2 launches because they want stablecoin-denominated gas, but neither company has publicly announced an L2 or cited stablecoin gas as a blocker, per Stripe’s 2024 stablecoin payments announcement and Circle’s product documentation that focus on USDC, CCTP, and Programmable Wallets rather than an L2. On current major Ethereum L2s, gas is paid in ETH, per Optimism and Arbitrum documentation, reinforcing ETH’s role as the native L2 fee asset. Stablecoin-fee user experience is already possible via account abstraction and paymasters that let users pay fees in USDC while the protocol settles gas in ETH, per the ERC‑4337 specification, Circle Programmable Wallets gas abstraction docs, and zkSync Era documentation on paymasters. Some networks natively allow multi-currency gas, such as Celo which supports fees in cUSD, showing stablecoin gas is technically feasible without launching a new L2, per Celo documentation. Trading takeaway: until an official L2 plan is disclosed by either firm, ETH remains the dominant L2 gas asset while USDC utility expands through mainstream integrations like Stripe’s stablecoin payments, per Stripe’s announcement and L2 documentation.