According to @godofprompt on X, prompt injection can exfiltrate credentials even when supply chain attacks get the headlines, and @composio claims its approach keeps API keys out of the agent’s context window entirely, limiting blast radius during a breach. As reported by @KaranVaidya6, typical agent setups over-permission Gmail, Calendar, Slack, Notion, and GitHub via broad OAuth scopes, creating high-value attack paths for injected prompts. According to composio.dev/protection, Composio brokers secure tool access without exposing raw credentials to the model, relying on scoped, revocable tokens and policy controls so agents invoke actions through a middleware layer rather than handling secrets directly. For AI teams, the business impact is reduced credential leakage, faster compliance reviews, and lower incident response overhead by centralizing permissions and audit logs, as stated by Composio’s product page. According to the cited posts, the practical takeaway is to remove API keys from model inputs, enforce least-privilege OAuth scopes, and route all tool calls through a controlled execution layer to withstand prompt injection.